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The Perspective of the Rebel:  
A Gap in the Global Normative Architecture  
Christopher J. Finlay 
 
 
“…a people in arms for liberty is the only [case] of any nicety, or 
which, theoretically at least, is likely to present conflicting moral considera-
tions.” 
—John Stuart Mill 
 
    
  
“Rebellion is not always evil.”1 So the English republican Algernon Sidney once declared to 
his great personal cost. When he wrote this in the 1680s, it was a deeply provocative state-
ment and, in fact, the manuscript in which it appeared was cited as ‘witness’  for the prosecu-
tion when he was tried and executed for treason in 1683.2 Today, for many who would de-
scribe themselves as democrats of one kind or another, some such idea is more or less axio-
matic. Often it reflects a commitment to what we may call the Rebel Principle, which holds, 
roughly, that if rebellion against one’s government is necessary as a means of resisting its op-
pressive policies, then it might be morally justifiable. Likewise, it might be morally justified 
as part of a more ambitious attempt at revolution in circumstances of profound and systemic 
political injustice.3  
In spite of the prevalence of this belief, however, we currently lack an adequate un-
derstanding of its normative implications. Moreover, recent attempts by the United States and 
other democracies to respond to oppressive political regimes in the Middle East demonstrate 
that this lacuna is a problem not just for political theory but also for practical politics. Three 
prominent recent cases reflect its importance.  
After the failure of efforts to induce internal rebellion in Iraq via the CIA during the 
1990s, the George W Bush administration toppled Saddam Hussain by means of military in-
vasion in 2003.4 Whether “ending tyranny,” as Fernando Tesón has described it, was intended 
as an end in itself or purely as a means of addressing purported security threats to the United 
States is a matter of controversy. Regardless of intent, the invasion brought about a revolu-
tionary outcome without awaiting the trigger of a domestic rebellion. As this article makes 
the case, the catastrophic results may be attributed in part to the failure to take into account 
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the need for popular political agency within Iraq when calculating the odds of any replace-
ment regime succeeding.5 In the second case of Libya, Western powers exploited the ambigu-
ities of a UN mandate concerned only with the prevention of war crimes as cover to assist 
rebels in bringing down the Qaddafi regime, a move that has so far only sown further civil 
conflict and created a power vacuum, leaving the country vulnerable to the ambitions of ISIS. 
And yet in the third case, the contrasting, more conservative approach taken by the United 
States and its allies toward Syria has only seen things go from bad to worse as moderate re-
bels have sought alternative sources of military support from increasingly radical Salafi-
Islamist groups. The humanitarian crisis reached a point such that even Michael Walzer, who 
had warned against intervention in all three states, publicly considered whether theorists 
might need to revisit the principle of nonintervention and debate anew the ethics of external 
military assistance to rebels.6  
These three contrasting cases indicate that not only do we lack a clear idea of how to 
pursue liberal-democratic commitments against foreign tyrannies but we also lack a pragmat-
ic default position in its absence.7 In this article I argue that our ability to judge such cases 
effectively has been impeded by a flaw in the normative architecture that arises from its fail-
ure to take account of what I call the Rebel Perspective. This refers to the theoretical point of 
view from which we can envisage the sort of demands those truly suffering from domestic 
tyranny might reasonably make, and from which we can specify appropriate ethical principles 
to guide rebels in a struggle to secure them. By specifying what those suffering oppression 
could justifiably do to resist, we also help to define what they might justifiably claim to need 
by way of assistance. The Rebel Perspective, therefore, plays a crucial role in determining 
how outside parties ought to describe, evaluate, and interact with rebel groups.  
In this article, I will use the terms “rebel” and “rebellion” to refer to (those contrib-
uting to) an attempt, at a minimum, to challenge and overturn the existing government in a 
state and, at a maximum, to bring about a revolution that challenges the political and social 
order of the state as such. This latter sense includes not only, say, cases of national liberation 
movements struggling against foreign or colonial rule and seeking to change the territorial 
range of the state but also attempts at radical change to the social and political order within a 
state. My concern, however, will chiefly be with armed rebellion.  
Elsewhere, I have set out what I think the rules and principles governing rebellion 
should be.8 My aim here is to show how the failure to take account of the Rebel Perspective 
not only constitutes a significant problem in its own right, but also constitutes a source of po-
tential instability within the wider global normative architecture governing the use of force: 
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i.e. the cluster of doctrines, laws, and vocabulary that are generally used to regulate and eval-
uate it. There is therefore an urgent need to think about how insights from newly emerging 
literature by political theorists on revolution and rebellion may be used to correct this flaw.9  
 
THREE PILLARS 
While human rights define fundamental values and specify claims that may be made against 
societies, my focus is on three further pillars of the global normative architecture that define 
the terms by which actions and judgements ought to be guided when these rights are under 
threat of violence. The three pillars have a particular bearing on rebellion in the following 
ways:  
(1) The concept of “terrorism” and the commitment to coordinated efforts to discour-
age, degrade, and defeat it;  
(2) The International Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law 
(collectively referred to in this article as “Law of War”) as a framework through 
which to interpret, evaluate, and guide the behavior of actors in armed conflict and 
through which to guide reactions to it by the international community; and  
(3) The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as a doctrine to guide the reactions of UN 
members to human rights violations by states against their own subjects, and the com-
plementary principle of nonintervention defined by the immunity of states from inter-
ference as guaranteed under the UN Charter when RtoP has not been triggered.10  
Directly or indirectly, all three pillars reflect specific undertandings of the possibility of legit-
imate (armed) resistance and how to respond to it. They suggest ways of interpreting and 
naming instances of nonstate violence, criteria by which to appraise them morally, and poli-
cies or actions that might be undertaken when they occur.11 The implied responses are not 
merely theoretical. They are also connected with legal rules, reinforcing their practical sali-
ence by specifying penalties and sanctioning enforcement.  
While each pillar casts a certain amount of light on the possibility of legitimate rebel-
lion, none illuminates it fully. Even when they highlight one facet of the problem, they often 
simultaneously throw others in shadow. All three efface or exclude – and thus render it im-
possible to think clearly about – certain forms of legitimate armed rebellion. Moreover, as 
legal frameworks these pillars include a degree of indeterminacy—gaps in normative guid-
ance that still need to be filled by means of practical judgement and perhaps further theoreti-
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cal input.12 On the other hand, each is also valuable to some degree, focusing our attention on 
a particular kind of threat to human rights and providing a framework for evaluating possible 
responses.13 So although the three pillars may be inadequate to the problem of nonstate vio-
lence taken as a whole, I believe we are compelled to retain them in some form, even if reas-
serting the Rebel Perspective might require us to adjust and renegotiate certain aspects of 
them in order to fill the gap in the global normative architecture regarding the use of force.  
 
PILLAR I: TERRORISM  
 
Whereas it is possible to use the word “terrorism” to make non-normative distinctions, the 
term is mainly pejorative, condemning those who resort to this type of political violence. And 
while many scholars have argued that the term ought to be used equally to challenge both the 
practices of states as well as nonstate actors, it remains a fact that it is more widely used in 
reference to the latter.14 It is a key label by which those participating in public debates often 
refer to nonstate political violence that they regard—or want others to regard—as wrongful. 
And it is also a central concept in legal measures both nationally and internationally aimed at 
degrading the ability of nonstate actors to threaten human rights. Insofar as “terrorism” thus 
refers to cases that have crossed a moral line within the category of nonstate political vio-
lence, it implies the possibility (a contrario) that nonstate political violence might also take 
forms that are not wrongful. We might be tempted to turn to this concept for some guidance 
in this regard,15 but I think there are two major obstacles to doing so. As I will detail in the 
following sections, the first is that the term is perennially susceptible to redefinition in ways 
that swing wildly between over- and under-inclusion; the second is that it might be under-
stood to imply a variety of contrasting wrongs and social evils. 
 
Terrorist and Non-terrorist Nonstate Violence 
Yasser Arafat’s speech to the UN General Assembly in November 1974 is a classic example 
of under-inclusion when it comes to the terrorist label. Arafat tried to challenge what he  per-
ceived to be the overextension of the category by appealing to the sympathies of people who 
felt that some armed resistance movements must be morally legitimate and therefore non-
terrorist. His method was to define as “revolutionaries” those who fight for a “just cause” 
while reserving “terrorist” for foreign occupiers and colonial powers, a move that attempted 
to draw attention away from the nature of a group’s tactics and refocus it on the nature of its 
aims. Like the more recent arguments by representatives from the Organization of the Islamic 
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Convention at the committee tasked with formulating a UN Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism, Arafat’s speech implied that those committed to political liberation 
were immune from the charge of terrorism. The pursuit of a just cause, he suggested, was all 
that mattered when it came to deciding the difference.16  
While I believe that the ethics of armed resistance and rebellion are much more com-
plicated than the picture Arafat painted, I sympathize with the sentiment that defining terror-
ism over-inclusively can cause laws and norms to be prejudiced to against nonstate actors. On 
the other hand, it is also true that under-inclusion can cause laws and norms to be prejudiced 
against the security of states. Writing soon after 9/11, for instance, Alan Dershowitz argued 
that the threat from al-Qaeda was itself an indirect result of under-inclusiveness in defining 
and responding to the wrongs of terrorism during earlier decades.17 He adopted an expansion-
ary approach, arguing that the problem of terrorism was overwhelmingly urgent, presenting 
an extraordinary danger to Western secular states. It therefore demanded the most robust ef-
forts to ensure that terrorist methods were deterred to the greatest extent possible. To achieve 
this end, it was essential that all those engaging in terrorism were prevented from gaining any 
reward for doing so, political or financial. Dershowitz also recognized that most people 
would regard at least some cases of nonstate political violence as legitimate, and that reason-
able people would always be prone to disagree about genuine exceptions since there was no 
objective or universally accepted way to adjudicate particular cases. Given the urgency of 
addressing the common threat, however, he concluded that citizens and political leaders must 
agree to condemn all cases of nonstate political violence as terrorism. In other words, even if 
this meant applying the prohibition on terrorism in a way that was over-inclusive, the dangers 
of under-inclusiveness were too great to let it get in the way of determined counterterror-
ism.18 
I have little sympathy for the specific definitional proposals implied by either Arafat 
or Dershowitz, but both show how legitimate concerns motivate contestation, rendering the 
first pillar quite unstable and incapable of guiding political debate in an authoritative and de-
terminate way. The problem is only intensified if we then turn to recent attempts to settle the 
wider controversy by appeal to customary law and legal treaty.  
One highly significant attempt to settle the definition of ‘terrorism’ as a matter of in-
ternational law was set out in the “Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law” (16 Febru-
ary 2011) issued by the Appeals Chamber for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The 
STL was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1757 on the 30 May 2007 as an in-
ternational criminal tribunal to try those accused of killing the former Lebanese Prime Minis-
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ter, Rafik Hariri, and twenty-one other people in a bomb attack in 2005. As such, its pro-
nouncements on such matters had great potential significance, with the potential to provide 
“long-anticipated answers to legal questions formerly only subject to academic debate,’ and 
thus to indicate ‘the general direction’ of subsequent jurisprudence.19  
The Decision argued that a “widely accepted definition of terrorism … has gradually 
emerged” across a wide range of national and international laws and treaties.20 The “custom-
ary rule of international law regarding the international crime of terrorism, at least in time of 
peace,” argues the STL, is defined by the following components:  
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, ar-
son, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the 
population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or 
indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain 
from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational element.21 
Since element (iii) is a prerequisite only for recognizing terrorism as an international crime, 
its terrorist character specifically is captured by elements (i) and (ii).22 
Far from settling the controversy as viewed from the Rebel Perspective, this definition 
exacerbates it by drawing a line between terrorist and non-terrorist that precludes the possi-
bility of legitimate nonstate armed actions against an oppressive regime, at least prior to such 
time as the rebels “exhibit such features as to enjoy international legal personality.”23 Legiti-
mate rebels will fall afoul of the consensus definition and face the sanctions that follow if 
they resort to armed force, satisfying condition (i), an act that will presumably be considered 
illegal by the governments they oppose. Further, by using force to try to compel an oppres-
sive state or government to change its policy or step down they will also satisfy condition 
(ii).24 Crucially, rebels who have not yet secured recognition as belligerents in a state of war 
will be treated as if they are committing these actions in “peacetime,” a difficulty to which I 
will return below.  
Thus the consensus definition offers no criterion by which to recognize the salient dif-
ference between those who ought (morally speaking) to be denounced as “terrorists” and 
those who have a rightful claim to recognition as legitimate “rebels.” The STL decision sug-
gests that such actions are “under no circumstances justifiable”25 and asserts the “social ne-
cessity” and obligation to punish those who engage in them.26  The STL assertion of a con-
sensus definition thus instantiates and renders legally salient the problem of over-inclusion, 
thereby casting a deep shadow obscuring the ethics of legitimate rebellion.  
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The wrongs of terrorism 
The second problem with guiding political reaction to potentially legitimate rebellions using 
the concept of terrorism is that it might be understood to imply a variety of contrasting 
wrongs and social evils. While these are all legitimate sources of moral concern, as recent 
philosophical debates suggest, they do not necessarily comprise a coherent, unified vision. 
My claim is that these wrongs will only begin to make complete sense when viewed as part 
of a wider account of the rights as well as the wrongs of nonstate political violence. 
The first wrong that the term “terrorism” implies is the one identified by Arafat and: 
the use of violence by nonstate agents for political ends that are not of the right kind or mag-
nitude to justify it. This is the nonstate equivalent of a war that fails to meet the ad bellum 
standard of just cause. In contrast with unjustified violence, the second wrong is when non-
state agents use violence illegitimately (another ad bellum issue) in the narrower sense of the 
word, meaning that they lack authority or political standing. Thus, even if there is a just 
cause, there might still be a valid objection where nonstate groups are seen as unjust actors if 
they usurp the right of a political community to make collective decisions about what causes 
to pursue, the best methods of securing them, which risks are and which are not bearable in 
pursuing them, and so forth. Even people suffering from political oppression might have a 
well-founded preference not to be represented by self-appointed paramilitaries claiming the 
right to fight on their behalf. The word “terrorist” is sometimes used to reflect this aspect of 
the paramilitaries’ violence.27 
Another wrong frequently implied by the term “terrorism” is the deliberate harming of 
people with immunity. The relevant categories are often designated as “civilians,” “noncom-
batants,” or “the innocent.” But using this wrong to pin down a definition of terrorism has 
proven difficult. If there is no recognized state of war, then the combatant vs. noncombatant 
distinction is not relevant. The criterion of innocence vs. non-innocence has triggered debates 
both about whether combatants are always non-innocent in a way that renders them liable to 
attack and about the degree to which civilians whose claims to moral innocence are open to 
doubt can insist on immunity.28 And if we were to define terrorism as the use of force against 
civilians, then the definition would exclude, by implication, soldiers and other members of 
the armed forces who are not civilians. Sometimes members of these groups might be liable 
to attack by legitimate rebels, and we might prefer not to designate such attacks as “terrorist.” 
But this should not be taken to imply that it is always more acceptable for nonstate groups to 
attack soldiers than to attack civilians.29  
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Thus even if our sole concern were with specifying the meaning of “terrorism” as a 
concept, I do not think it would suffice only to enumerate the different wrongs with which it 
is identified and try to identify connections between them.30 In many cases, the wrongs of 
terrorism are defined by exceeding the limits of the rights of rebellion. We would therefore 
also need an account of the conditions under which soldiers or others might become liable to 
harm by rebels. What sorts of cause would be of sufficient importance to merit such measures 
and under precisely what sorts of conditions? What conditions would rebels have to satisfy to 
be able to speak as the legitimate agents of those they claim to represent? And what princi-
ples of jus in bello should they follow? For convenience, I will refer in the remainder of this 
piece to rebels who satisfy all ethical requirements (having a just cause, possessing appropri-
ate political standing, and adhering to an appropriate standard of jus in bello) as “legitimate.” 
The full complexity of the ethics of nonstate political violence cannot be grasped fully with 
reference to the notion of terrorism alone any more than the morality of war can be derived 
entirely from the notion of war crimes: crimes of war are partly defined against the rights of 
belligerents; and the wrongs of terrorism are likewise defined by the limits of legitimate re-
bellion.  
I now turn to the question of whether the second pillar, the Law of War, can accom-
modate the normative parameters and consequences of the Rebel Principle in a sufficiently 
comprehensive and coherent way such that it remedies the inadequacies of the Terrorism pil-
lar.  
 
PILLAR II: THE LAW OF WAR  
Michael Ignatieff has argued that while human rights are essentially nonviolent, enjoining 
individuals to settle differences through peaceful means, they might also justify a resort to 
armed rebellion against oppressors who refuse to recognize and respect them. If violence 
proves truly unavoidable, he maintains, rebels must then revert to the second-best ethical 
frame of reference designed for those circumstances: the Law of War.31 
Ignatieff’s view reflects the common practice of debating ethical performance in 
armed conflict with reference to legal principles, particularly noncombatant immunity. And, 
indeed, insofar as it may be applied to conflicts involving legitimate rebels, the Law of War 
has considerable merits. Above all, it offers action-guidance for combatants, both state and 
nonstate, by defining the immunities of noncombatants and the limits of permissible force. 
By identifying direct attacks against noncombatants as criminal acts, the Law of War pro-
vides an incentive structure and a heuristic for combatants as well as a roadmap for those not 
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engaged in combat to predict and avoid risks. Insofar as it thereby shapes the behavior of 
combatants, it may thus limit the destructiveness of armed conflicts. And importantly, the 
Law of War provides a normative frame of reference through which others can evaluate and 
contest the conduct of belligerents. But while the Law of War might offer a useful normative 
framework to interpret the use of force in some armed conflicts involving rebels, it is unlikely 
to do so for all such cases. It leaves users with two fundamental problems.  
The first arises from sources of normative indeterminacy in international law when it 
comes to defining the political status of rebels. Whereas the boundaries and strictures of the 
Law of War are relatively simple when warring parties are states and they fight openly, things 
become much more problematic when one party is a nonstate actor. Central to the normal op-
eration of the Law of War is the principle of equality according to which each side recipro-
cates in playing by the same rules: both abide by noncombatant immunity and both respect 
the right of opposing combatants to use force discriminately. The problem for justified rebels 
is that, while they may well be subject to the prohibitions specified by of the Law of War, 
they might not be seen as benefiting from the permissions that are also associated with it—in 
particular, the “belligerent privilege,” which bestows both the right to participate in hostilities 
and the immunities enjoyed by combatants.32 On what Jens David Ohlin calls “the orthodox 
view,” rebels cannot claim recognition and belligerent privilege under any circumstance.33 
And even on views that challenge this orthodoxy by suggesting that rebels might be able to 
claim recognition in some cases, the circumstances that trigger this right do not necessarily 
track the morality of rebellion very closely. 
On the first of these circumstances, recognition might be expected to occur once the 
intensity of conflict and the degree of organization shown by the rebels passes a certain 
threshold, thus basing judgements about status on the terms of Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. Or, second, recognition might be based on the even more demanding 
criterion that nonstate parties must have control over territory before the conflict is necessari-
ly treated formally as a “Non-international Armed Conflict,” based on the 1977 Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (AP2), Article 1.34 Or, third, if we follow Ohlin’s view 
on the deep logic of the Law of War, it might be that rebels can gain recognition for their 
combatants on the basis of satisfying the “functions” of belligerency, including the use of 
fixed insignia, the establishment of a responsible chain of command, abiding by the princi-
ples of the Law of War, and so on. But there are problems with all these approaches.35 
The first is that intensity will not necessarily track justification: Some illegitimate re-
bels with objectionable aims that are at odds with human rights – such as the fascists who re-
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belled against the Spanish Republic in 1936 or, indeed, the rebellious states in the American 
civil war – might have been able to achieve recognition on this basis faster than some legiti-
mate ones. And on any such approach, morally legitimate rebels would suffer from nonrec-
ognition and the associated penalties when the revolt is still incipient – the classic example is 
that of the American revolutionaries early in the war of 1775-83 when the British Crown de-
clared them to be traitors and denied them the customary rights of prisoners of war. Second, 
as Anthony Cullen comments, a “plain reading” of common Article 3 leads to the conclusion 
that applying its final clause “has no effect on the legal status of nonstate actors and as such 
does not in any way prevent a de jure government from treating them as criminals for their 
participation in a non-international armed conflict.”36 So, while the recognition of a condition 
of (non-international) armed conflict might be obligatory on the basis of either Common Ar-
ticle 3 or AP2, it is less clear that recognition of the rebels follows. In such a case, rebel 
fighters might find themselves liable to prosecution for war crimes under the Law of War if 
they violate noncombatant immunity and to a domestic criminal charge of murder even for 
ostensibly discriminate acts of war against state soldiers.37  
The third problem is that, even if Ohlin is correct about the deeper logic of the law 
and that either legalism of the Law of War—common Article 3 or AP2—could compel states 
to recognize rebels as having belligerent rights, neither should necessarily lead us to expect 
recognition in the right cases considered from the Rebel Perspective. Rebels without just 
cause might abide by the functional criteria of belligerency that Ohlin identifies; rebels with a 
just cause might sometimes be unable to.  
This takes us to the second major problem with the Law of War as a normative 
framework for guiding and judging rebels. One reason rebels might not be able to satisfy 
Ohlin’s criteria is due to the problems of wearing a fixed insignia or an identifiable uniform 
in a conflict against the domestic state, and the effect this has on the rebellion’s chances of 
success. Though the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP1) permits guerrilla forces to maintain the 
appearance of civilians (unless deployed for attack) during “international” conflicts against 
colonial powers, alien occupation, or domestic racist regimes, it does not extend to non-
international, purely domestic rebellions (some states reject this clause of AP1 altogether). It 
is certainly true that during some conflicts rebels may eventually command some territory 
within the state and their forces may reach a scale at which direct engagement with state forc-
es using regular methods in conventional confrontations becomes feasible. In such cases the 
prohibition on perfidious methods set out in AP1, for instance, may then be comparatively 
easy to satisfy. And the moral rationale for doing so is likely to be very strong: Distinguish-
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ing clearly between rebel soldiers and the surrounding population on whose behalf, in theory, 
they fight is consistent with the aim of liberating those people and trying to seek protections 
for their human rights. But during the early phases of such a struggle, satisfying those re-
quirements without jeopardizing all possibility of success might not be realistic. When state 
forces have command of the territory as a whole, their technological military dominance like-
ly means they will be able to monitor and track down rebels much more easily than rebels 
monitor and track down them. If guerrilla fighters take care to distinguish themselves by 
openly carrying arms, wearing combat uniforms, and the like, they risk exposing themselves 
to air strikes, for example.38  
The difficulty of complying with the uniform convention is just one of several possi-
ble ways in which the Law of War might prove too demanding for justified rebellions. As I 
argue elsewhere, other practices prohibited by the Law of War, such as the use of civilian 
disguise as a means of ambush or the targeting of civilians, might be justifiable in certain 
cases, say, when those civilians contribute in significant ways to state oppression. The pres-
sure to adopt alternatives to conventional military methods are greatest where asymmetries of 
technology and military force between poorly armed rebels and well-equipped state forces are 
most severe. Such irregular methods may be justifiable particularly when pro-government 
forces refuse recognition to rebel fighters and systematically violate the Law of War.39 
Bracketing for a moment the question of just cause, this pressure can be seen in conflicts with 
insurgent forces across a wide range of contexts since World War II, from the Algerian War 
of Independence, to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
In summary, the Law of War is unlikely to map neatly and directly onto the morality 
of justified rebellion across all possible cases. This is partly a result of how limited the moral-
ly permissible tactics available to rebels are. But above all, indeterminacy in the criteria gov-
erning the recognition of nonstate belligerents renders rebels uncertain about their status and 
leaves them vulnerable to the worst of both worlds: liability to punishment for crimes defined 
by the Law of War without immunity for discriminate fighting.  
 
III: NON-INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The third and final pillar to admit some light onto rebellion is the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP). On the face of it, RtoP’s modification of the Westphalian commitment to sovereign 
immunity from outside interference seems a promising way to justify responding to cases 
where legitimate but beleaguered rebels call for international assistance. But whereas its early 
formulations opened up a space within which to consider such cases, the political practice 
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that has emerged since its promulgation in 2001 has closed much of it down again. Indeed, 
the resulting principle has much in common with the qualified principle of nonintervention 
sketched out by John Stuart Mill in his famous essay of 1859.40  
According to RtoP, states have immunity from intervention if they successfully dis-
charge their responsibility to protect their own citizens and subjects, whereas sufficiently se-
rious failures to do so may trigger a duty on the part of other states to intervene. The major 
change to the doctrine has been the redefinition of the thresholds above which the right to 
non-interference becomes moot and the duty to intervene is triggered. Early formulations 
specified only that human lives need be threatened on a “large scale” and constraints on in-
tervention were stated in just war terms, chiefly with reference to the ad bellum principle of 
proportionality. So the upshot could be interpreted as a principle permitting State A to inter-
vene militarily in State B if doing so could be expected to achieve a net benefit in protections 
from lethal violence as compared with not acting.41 On the assumption that armed rebellion is 
similarly justifiable only in the face of a regime committed to using lethal repressive force, 
the doctrine might therefore have permitted intervention in a relatively wide range of cases 
where legitimate rebellion was under way and might have lent some assistance in defeating 
human rights-violating governments.42 However, a later formulation in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome document (endorsed by 191 countries) narrowed the triggers for armed in-
tervention to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”43 Fol-
lowing the outcome document, the resulting convergence between RtoP and Mill’s account of 
the principle of nonintervention was so striking that Michael Doyle found in Mill’s argu-
ments an effective account of the key normative parameters of the current doctrine.44 And the 
central thrust of Mill’s argument, of course, was to challenge the idea of intervening to assist 
rebels engaged in armed revolt against a domestic government.45 
Two key arguments for prohibiting assistance to legitimate rebels may be drawn from 
Mill’s essay. The first we may call the “rebel learning” objection. Mill assumes that political 
freedom can survive only where citizens have certain necessary “feelings and virtues” to 
equip and motivate them to defend it. These include, above all, a profound appreciation for 
the value of liberty.46 Despotism and slavery provide unpromising soil in which to cultivate 
these qualities, but there is some hope that the oppressed may acquire the necessary feelings 
and virtues in the “school” of political struggle. When this takes the form of open confronta-
tion with the regime, then it is participation in the rebellion itself that deepens the roots of 
these values.47 Intervening to support a revolution, the argument goes, therefore risks thwart-
ing a learning process that is vital to political success. The second objection is epistemic. Mill 
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assumes that only the successful defeat of domestic tyranny can demonstrate that people are 
ready for political freedom. This should be sufficient warning against interference: Helping 
rebels to secure an outcome that we cannot be sure they could have achieved by themselves 
might result in the establishment of political freedom for a people not yet ready to maintain 
it.48 The force of this objection is strengthened by the assumption that intervention should 
presumably only be contemplated in the first place if the rebels seem likely to succumb with-
out outside help.  
There are, of course, exceptions to Mill’s principle of nonintervention. He thought it 
might be permissible to assist secessionists fighting to secure self-rule against a larger, multi-
ethnic state. The grounds for doing so are that intervention in such cases would not interfere 
with the self-determination of a people and, hence, with its learning processes; rather, it could 
facilitate self-determination of peoples by helping ensure that each has its own state and, con-
sequently, a qualified immunity from intervention by others. Similarly, if one state wrongful-
ly intervenes in a purely domestic rebellion, then the principle of nonintervention permits 
others to engage in counter-interventions aiming to offset any artificial distortions to the bal-
ance of domestic forces.49 The chief type of case that permits intervention on grounds that 
override the rationale for nonintervention arise when, to use Walzer’s influential expression, 
“acts that shock the conscience of mankind” cannot be stopped by any other means (or where 
intervention is the most proportionate means of stopping them). Such “severities repugnant to 
humanity,” as Mill calls them, are now specified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and ethnic cleansing.  
Like the formulators of the RtoP doctrine, Mill concludes that any material assistance 
to rebels is prohibited unless it is directed against a state engaged in one or more of these 
crimes. This is a highly problematic conclusion when viewed from the Rebel Perspective. 
Unless Millians assume that the balance of military strength in a civil war always tracks the 
balance of political allegiances across the national population, there will be cases where re-
bellion is justified in principle but will be defeated unless it receives outside help. And as 
critics of Walzer’s appropriation of Mill’s argument in Just and Unjust Wars have long ar-
gued, this assumption is tendentious, and the above cases likely.50 A government that main-
tains the support of the regular armed forces (not to mention mercenaries) will usually enjoy 
major advantages in military strength even without outside help.51 Its prospects for victory 
are therefore likely to be out of proportion to its legitimacy across the civilian population.  
Insofar as RtoP narrows the exceptions to nonintervention even more drastically than 
Mill, it consequently casts a dark shadow that obscures cases visible from the Rebel Perspec-
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tive. There are at least three hypothetical cases, each to a degree effectively concealed in a 
global order committed to upholding RtoP. In the first case, a just rebellion is precluded from 
the benefit of outside intervention. In the latter two cases legitimate would-be rebels who ad-
here to just war principles but have no chance of receiving outside help are effectively pro-
hibited from even beginning their struggle. They are therefore likely to go unnoticed.   
The first case is the simplest: rebellion might break out on behalf of a people that val-
ues liberty enough to take great risks and make enormous sacrifices for it, and yet it might be 
defeated if the armed forces remain loyal to the incumbent regime. The rebels might be hope-
ful to begin with and yet find that their chances begin to fade in the absence of outside mili-
tary support to counterbalance the strength of a regime artificially inflated not by popular po-
litical support but by more effective armed forces. And state forces manage to defeat them by 
conventional military means, avoiding the sort of atrocities that might trigger a military inter-
vention likely to help the rebels. Let us call this type of scenario a case of “simple military 
defeat.”52  
To illustrate the second  case, consider the following hypothetical. The political re-
gime in a foreign state is oppressive, persistently and widely violating human rights and pro-
hibiting the exercise of civil and political freedoms. Its inherently violent nature renders it 
liable to justified rebellion in principle, but it avoids committing the sort of sudden, large-
scale atrocities that might trigger intervention under RtoP. Security forces are loyal to the re-
gime, but the civilian population is almost uniformly opposed to it. Community leaders might 
therefore be able to initiate popular protest and resistance, but they recognize that doing so is 
likely to trigger an escalating cycle of violence, leading toward a civil war that they would 
have little or no chance of winning on their own.53 In such a case, the ad bellum condition 
requiring that those beginning a war have a “reasonable prospect of success” would seem to 
prohibit resistance in the absence of outside help. Lacking an all-things-considered justifica-
tion, opposition leaders would therefore remain quiet and avoid provoking the regime. We 
may call this sort of scenario a “futility trap.” 
Let us then suppose the rebels did believe they had a reasonable chance of success. 
The jus ad bellum then makes further demands that might still stand in their way if they could 
not call on international assistance. Proportionality demands not only that the initiation of war 
be non-futile but also that it be expected to secure enough good in terms of lives defended or 
rights protected to outweigh the harms it is likely to cause. If this means that when deciding 
whether to initiate a confrontation rebels must take into account the numbers of innocent cas-
ualties they can expect as a result of the war taken as a whole (inflicted both by them and 
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their opponents54), then it is highly likely they will find themselves caught within what we 
will call a “proportionality trap.” Cases like the Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq illustrate 
the two types of trap, both having demonstrated not only a capacity to crush revolt, but a will-
ingness to inflict devastating casualties while doing so. That a similar effect might be 
achieved while using methods that could be defended as technically discriminate under the 
Law of War is exemplified by the Israeli bombardment of Gaza in 2008-9 and 2014. In such 
cases, any attempts at armed resistance (whether legitimate or not) are demonstrably futile 
and incapable of satisfying ad bellum Proportionality. 
The proportionality trap scenario can arise for any party—state or nonstate—that has 
just cause for war, but rebels are more likely face it due to inferior arms and organization. 
And their predicament is made worse by what we will call the “proportionality paradox.” On 
the one hand, the more oppressive the regime, the greater the urgency of defeating it and, 
hence, the more compelling the in principle justification for rebellion (in other words, the 
gravity of the justifying cause). On the other hand, however, it is also likely to be true that the 
more oppressive the regime, the more brutal its methods will be if confronted, and the greater 
the costs it will be willing to impose as a deterrent. If the regime is able to sufficiently ratchet 
up the levels of damage it inflicts fighting the rebels while avoiding clearly visible breaches 
of the Law of War, then it may be able to increase the costs of resistance enough so as to 
make it self-defeating. To do so, the regime must ensure that the levels of violence inflicted 
on the rebels and their supporters greatly exceed those it routinely inflicts when it is unresist-
ed. I think it is possible for regimes to do this. The Law of War permits belligerents a degree 
of proportionate collateral damage, but it is very hard to determine precisely when in bello 
proportionality has been exceeded. This means that, whereas the force of an in principle justi-
fication for rebellion increases continuously in proportion to regime brutality, the likelihood 
of an all-things-considered justification might not. The more willing a regime is to inflict 
such harms, the harder it becomes to satisfy the conditions for an all-things-considered rebel-
lion against it.  
Insofar as it relies on the visibility and success of a rebellion as indicators to outsiders 
of the readiness of a people for domestic liberty, the Millian approach to domestic rebellions 
is therefore highly problematic from the Rebel Perspective. We expect that not only will peo-
ple who are prepared for political freedom sometimes fail in their resistance but also that they 
will sometimes show no overt signs of resistance at all. Thus, neither of these results tells us 
anything definitive about potential justification of or support for rebellion. The futility and 
proportionality traps that the Rebel Perspective illustrates show how something that looks 
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like peace from the outside perspective of RtoP can be purely superficial, masking buried 
conflict.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the existing global normative architecture regarding the use of force is in-
adequate as a guide for responding to rebellion internationally. While it casts limited light on 
some facets of the problem, the pillars that uphold it obscure a great deal across a potentially 
significant range of possibilities. The terrorism pillar obscures the possibility of non-terrorist, 
nonstate political violence, rendering legitimate rebels liable to counterterrorist measures and 
criminal prosecution for terrorist crimes. The Law of War pillar is likely to exclude at least 
some cases of incipient or low-intensity rebellion, leaving rebels without privileges or com-
batant immunity, and is problematic as a framework for evaluating rebels who justifiably use 
irregular methods that the pillar prohibits.55 Finally, the RtoP pillar prohibits intervening to 
assist rebels who can satisfy just cause requirements, but who struggle to satisfy the need for 
an all-things-considered justification for rebellion without external assistance. Taken togeth-
er, we might say that the three pillars thereby create what Ian Clark calls “zones of acute vul-
nerability”56—political spaces in which people are unprotected from severe human rights vio-
lations.  
My chief aim has been to show that there is such a problem, to define it, and to show 
why it needs attention. To what degree we might need to alter the existing architecture in or-
der to address this problem is a matter for wider debate. But I will conclude by sketching out 
some suggestions.  
Perhaps most clearly, the way in which we approach the definition of “terrorism” 
seems profoundly inadequate, particularly the consensus view, since it precludes recognition 
of legitimate rebellion from the very start. Securing states against true cases of terrorism is 
important, but the definition must be rethought based on the recognition that there is a moral 
right to rebel against intolerable oppression, and that doing so should not be categorized as 
terrorism. Second, as desirable as it may be that all participants in armed conflict be persuad-
ed to abide by the Law of War, it is necessary to recognize that the moral right of legitimate 
rebels to use force is likely to arise at some point before they gain recognition as having a le-
gal right to fight. It is necessary, therefore, to give careful attention to the threshold at which 
recognition may be demanded, thus triggering the rights of belligerents. This is a problem 
that I think law alone will not entirely settle. Rather, it should be approached as a matter of 
political judgement in which both legal and moral principles are taken into account along 
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with the concrete specificities of the case in question. And there may be other ways in which 
political judgement is required to adjudicate between morality and law in relation to jus in 
bello.57  
Finally, incorporating the Rebel Perspective requires revision of the principle of non-
intervention. An assessment of the various normative traps facing legitimate rebels indicates 
that intervention might be considered justifiable across a wider range of cases than is current-
ly licensed by RtoP. For instance, by specifying more clearly the points at which assistance 
could justifiably be requested from the Rebel Perspective, a prima facie case could be made 
justifying material assistance to help legitimate rebels satisfy the success and proportionality 
conditions. Of course, there might be a worry that doing so could increase the number of 
overt civil conflicts.58 On the other hand, however, admitting such possibilities could also 
help address the problem of moral hazard identified with current doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention. Alan Kuperman maintains that RtoP already encourages rebels to provoke their 
enemies into committing the sorts of large-scale international crimes that are currently the 
only recognized triggers for intervention.59 Were the threshold lower, then the degree of vio-
lence rebels would be tempted to provoke might be lower too. The proportionality-based 
threshold indicated in the earliest outline of RtoP might therefore be a more suitable frame-
work in light of this issue. If it were applied to cases involving legitimate rebellion, it could 
be formulated so as to permit assistance only on strict terms that reflect judgements under just 
cause, legitimate authority, and right intention while taking due account of the difficulties 
that rebels will experience in satisfying the success and proportionality conditions without 
assistance.  
Another objection to widening RtoP is that it could license a greater number of mis-
guided or unscrupulous interventions. I am doubtful it would, however. The unscrupulous 
will always abuse the rhetoric of counterterrorism or humanitarianism to mask their strategic 
aims, as witness the Russian bombing of rebels in Syria. Misguided interventions, too, are 
likely to happen even without revision to RtoP. In fact, if anything, the lack of clear princi-
ples by which to guide morally justifiable attempts to assist rebels constitutes an important 
doctrinal gap rendering ill-designed intervention more likely. Well-intentioned but poorly 
judged attempts at assistance are more likely when they have to take place “under the norma-
tive radar,” so to speak. And mission creep (such as when an intervention to prevent war 
crimes was used to help remove Qaddafi in 2011) and secrecy are more likely to occur when 
political leaders follow the intuitions of the Rebel Principle without an adequate and recog-
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nized normative framework to guide and legitimate their actions. Accountability might there-
fore increase under a properly formulated revision to rules governing intervention. 
If so, then one key issue likely to receive more careful attention from interveners is 
the agency of those they seek to benefit. Whereas the current paradigm of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes tends to view those threatened with human rights violations chiefly as 
patients awaiting help, the Rebel Perspective reflects the capacity that these actors have for 
political agency. It therefore underlines the fact that intervening states must navigate the ap-
propriate relationship between two types of agents: interveners and rebels. And this in turn 
requires critical reflection on the political legitimacy of rebellion leaders as well as the justice 
of the ends they pursue. In a context like Syria, it would require taking special care to form 
alliances with the most promising of the factions within the wider rebellion, and working 
strategically both to guide and shape their political ambitions and to help them secure the 
strongest possible position within the rebellion as a whole.60 Of course, these aims would 
have to be weighed in the balance against the enormous complexity of intervening in a con-
flict involving multiple parties, including those assisting the regime. While the Rebel Per-
spective might help formulate the best imaginable (I hesitate to say “ideal”) strategy, political 
wisdom demands careful consideration of matters such as the risk of wider conflict arising 
from attacks on international proxies, for instance. On the other hand, the presence of Russian 
weapons and forces on the side of Assad makes the Syrian case a more amenable one from a 
Millian point of view: as Mill himself declared, a “government which needs foreign support 
to enforce obedience from its own citizens, is one which ought not to exist.”61   
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